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In 1986, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops published a
"Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Econ-
omy," entitled Economic Justice for All.' They addressed the letter
to "Brothers and Sisters in Christ," and began as follows:
We are believers called to follow Our Lord Jesus Christ and proclaim his
Gospel in the midst of a complex and powerful economy. This reality poses
both opportunities and responsibilities for Catholics in the United
States. . . .This letter is a personal invitation to Catholics to use the re-
sources of our faith, the strength of our economy, and the opportunities of
our democracy to shape a society that better protects the dignity and basic
rights of our sisters and brothers both in this land and around the world.
The bishops emphasized that they wrote "as pastors, not public offi-
cials,"2 but they addressed their congregation as "Catholics in the
United States seeking to live their faith in the marketplace - in
homes, offices, factories, and schools; on farms and ranches; in board
rooms and union halls; in service agencies and legislative cham-
bers." 3 Their "call to action" was intended to affect individual
Catholics' "economic decisions to buy, sell, invest, divest, hire or
fire" and also their decisions "in public life":4
* B.A. 1974, L.L.B. 1978, University of Otago, New Zealand; D. Phil. 1986, Ox-
ford University; Professor of Law and Chair, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program,
School of Law (Boalt Hall) University of California at Berkeley. An earlier draft of this
Article was presented at a conference at the University of San Diego School of Law. I
am grateful to the participants - particularly Kent Greenawalt, David Hollenbach S.J.,
and Charles Larmore - for their comments, and also to Sanford Kadish, Robert Post, and
Eric Rakowski at Boalt Hall.
1. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL
(1986) [hereinafter THE LETTER]. In the text, I shall often refer to this work as "the
Pastoral Letter" or the "Letter."
2. Id. at vii.
3. Id. at vi.
4. Id. at xiii.
The pursuit of economic justice takes believers into the public arena, testing
the policies of government by the principles of our teaching. We ask you to
become more informed and active citizens, using your voices and votes to
speak for the voiceless, to defend the poor and the vulnerable and to ad-
vance the common good. We are called to shape a community of con-
science, measuring every policy by how it touches the least, the lost, and the
left-out among us.5
This excerpt gives an indication of the contents of the Pastoral
Letter (though the detail will not concern us here). The letter calls
for economic rights or what are sometimes called welfare rights: "the
creation of an order that guarantees the minimum conditions of
human dignity in the economic sphere for every person."' The bish-
ops "recommend that the nation make a major new commitment to
achieve full employment .. . [with] expansion of job-training and
apprenticeship programs in the private sector administered and sup-
ported jointly by business, labor unions and government."7 They rec-
ommend "a thorough reform of the nation's welfare and income
support programs," including an increase in payments under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), so that the
level of assistance at least reaches the officially defined poverty line.
Moreover, the bishops say, the federal government should remedy
disparities in welfare provisions among the various states, and make
AFDC available to two-parent as well as one-parent families.8 The
recommendations are not just confined to domestic issues: the bish-
ops also call "for a U.S. international economic policy designed to
empower people everywhere and enable them to continue to develop
a sense of their own worth, improve the quality of their lives, and
ensure that the benefits of economic growth are shared equitably."
These and other recommendations are argued for on the basis of
familiar principles about community, social justice, private property,
compassion, and the relation between rights and responsibilities. In
the Pastoral Letter, however, such principles do not stand by them-
selves as premises. Rather, they serve a mediating role between the
particular policy recommendations and a number of specifically reli-
gious and biblical doctrines on which the principles - and thus ulti-
mately the recommendations - are taken to be based. For example,
the bishops cite a number of Old Testament texts that testify to the
existence of "a biblical vision of economic justice":
Every human person is created as an image of God, and the denial of dig-
nity to a person is a blot on this image. Creation is a gift to all men and
women, not to be appropriated for the benefit of a few; .... The same
5. Id. at xv.
6. Id. at 49 (this and other policy recommendations that I quote are in italics in
the original).
7. Id. at 78-79.
8. Id. at 102-05.
9. Id. at 142.
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God who came to the aid of an oppressed people and formed them into a
covenant community continues to hear the cries of the oppressed and to
create communities which are responsive to God's word. 10
The bishops also cite the teachings of Jesus Christ, warning against
attempts to lay up treasures on earth and attacking the use of reli-
gion to avoid the demands of charity and justice.11 They retell the
parable of the Good Samaritan,12 emphasizing that it was Christ's
gloss on his second great commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neigh-
bor as thyself."1 3 They invoke Christ's vivid picture of the Son of
Man coming to judge the nations of the world:14
Then He will also say to those on the left hand, "Depart from Me, you
cursed, into the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels: For I
was hungry and you gave Me no food; I was thirsty and you gave Me no
drink; I was a stranger and you did not take Me in, naked and you did not
clothe Me, sick and in prison and you did not visit Me." Then they also will
answer Him, saying, "Lord, when did we see You hungry or thirsty or a
stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to You?" Then
He will answer them, saying, "Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did
not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to Me." And these
will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life. 15
Thus, the Pastoral Letter is no ordinary social justice polemic. It
offers, as a contribution to public debate, a vision of government and
society that is pervasively and explicitly based on a vision of God
and of His purposes with mankind.
II
Such a document raises an interesting issue for political philoso-
phy. What part should doctrines and arguments rooted in religious
beliefs play in political debate? Is there not something inappropriate
or, so to speak, uncivil about presenting such arguments in the pub-
lic forum in a society that exhibits an enormous variety of religious
commitments among its members, and in which citizens have com-
mitted themselves collectively and fundamentally, in their constitu-
tion, to a doctrine of separation between church and state?
The question is not easily avoided. It might be thought that the
Pastoral Letter is intended only to be used by Catholics in their con-
versations with other Catholics, but that is not the case. The bishops
10. Id. at 22. ,
11. Id. at 23 (citing Matthew 6:19 and Mark 7:9-13).
12. Luke 10:29-37.
13. Luke 10:27.
14. THE LE"rER, supra note 1, at 24.
15. Matthew 25:41-46.
evidently expect the teachings and arguments of the document to be
deployed by Catholics as they participate in the political life of the
nation, alongside fellow citizens of other denominations. As we have
seen, Catholics are called on to use the resources of their faith as
they vote, deliberate, and interact with others in their capacity as
legislators and officials if they happen to hold positions of special
power, and certainly in their capacity as participants in the demo-
cratic political system.
It might be thought that the Pastoral Letter offers only bland plat-
itudes of the "motherhood and apple pie" variety, sentiments that
will have a broad and inoffensive nonsectarian appeal. That is also
not the case. The authors clearly believe that the Christian faith, as
understood by the Catholic Church, has a distinct perspective to of-
fer on the great issues facing the United States: "We should not be
surprised if we find Catholic social teaching to be demanding. The
Gospel is demanding.' 6 The Pastoral Letter was written because the
bishops thought that if certain things were not said by the church
regarding various issues, those things might remain unsaid or un-
heard. They thought, too, that some existing political and social posi-
tions on issues like poverty and global redistribution, if they were not
seconded by the church, might attract less support than they
deserved.
Far from being bland and noncontroversial, much of the Letter
will seem mysterious or meaningless to those who do not adopt a
spiritual or Christian or even specifically Roman Catholic perspec-
tive. For example, all of the principles underpinning the bishops' pol-
icy recommendations are qualified by their conviction that:
The fulfillment of human needs, we know, is not the final purpose of the
creation of the human person. We have been created to share in the divine
life through a destiny that goes far beyond our human capabilities and
before which we must in all humility stand in awe.17
This qualification will be hard for nonbelievers to accept or under-
stand; they may be unwilling to compromise their attention to ex-
isting human need in favor of attention to the holy, the divine, or the
hereafter.' 8 The bishops cite Aquinas as authority for the proposition
16. THE LETTER, supra note 1, at xiii. Compare Matthew 19:16, 21-2:
Now behold, one came and said to Him, 'Good Teacher, what good thing shall
I do that I may have eternal life?' Jesus said to Him, 'If you want to be per-
fect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in
heaven; and come, follow Me.' But when the young man heard that saying, he
went away sorrowful, for he had great possessions.
17. THE LETTER, supra note 1, at 182.
18. Compare this with the dispute in Matthew 26:7-11:
A woman came to Him having an alabaster flask of very costly fragrant oil,
and she poured it on His head as He sat at the table. But when His disciples
saw it, they were indignant, saying, 'Why this waste? For this fragrant oil
might have been sold for much and given to the poor.' But when Jesus was
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that all capital resources are held by firms and individuals "in trust"
for others and for the society as a whole.19 Defenders of absolute
property rights may wonder what attention they should give to such
specifically theological writings on the subject. The bishops say that
because "we profess to be members of a 'catholic' or universal
Church," global problems like Third-World debt and sub-Saharan
famine become urgent issues for us.20 Advocates of isolationism and
"America-first" may wonder why they should be moved by an ap-
peal to the professed universal character of an organization to which
(they believe) they do not belong. The bishops identify the desire for
great wealth with the sin of idolatry, which they regard, in turn, as
the primal sin of Adam and Eve: "They turned away from God and
gave to God's creation the obedience due to God alone."'" An athe-
ist, however, will not grasp at all why idolatry is a sin, if idolatry is
defined purely in terms of attention to the things of this world, in
contrast to attention to another world or to a transcendent being that
the atheist believes does not exist.
The bishops conclude the theological part of their disquisition with
an assertion of the distinctive role of Christ in their lives:
A Christian walks in the newness of life22 and is "a new creation; the old
has passed away, the new has come ... ."3 Our action on behalf of justice
in our world proceeds from the conviction that, despite the power of injus-
tice and violence, life has been fundamentally changed by the entry of the
Word made flesh into human history.24
This premise about the striking change wrought in history by the
Incarnation will be rejected not only by atheists, but by followers of
Judaism, Islam, and all other non-Christian religions, in addition to
several Christian denominations that have committed themselves to
a much less "literal" view of Jesus.
The bishops' thoughts on social justice, however, would not be
aware of it, He said to them, 'Why do you trouble the woman? For she has
done a good work for Me. For you have the poor with you always, but Me you
do not have always.'
See also the discussion in MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 77 (1986):
"[Tlhe great enemy of religion is not science, nor the active profession of unbelief, but
rather the silent and pervasive plausibility of earthly need as a metaphysics of ordinary
life. In the desires and needs of the body, human life can find all its justification."
19. THE LETTER, supra note 1, at 57 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THE-
OLOGICA, Ha, Ilae, q.66 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947)).
20. Id. at 181.
21. Id. at 18.
22. Romans 6:4.
23. 2 Corinthians 5:17.
24. THE LErTER, supra note 1, at 30.
worth writing about or taking so much trouble to elaborate if they
were not based on premises like these. Their aim is to place at their
audience's disposal precisely those distinctive resources of faith
which they believe should inform a specifically Catholic or a specifi-
cally Christian perspective on social justice.
The problem, then, is as follows. In calling on Catholics to deploy
.these distinctively Christian insights into public life, the bishops
seem to be calling on them to debate, deliberate, and vote in ways
that many of their fellow citizens will not understand. They appear
to be calling on them to participate in public life in a voice other
than the idiom of "public reason" that their fellow participants can
engage with. How, we may ask, do the bishops expect such contribu-
tions by members of their flock to be received in the wider commu-
nity? Do they expect that the views expressed and the arguments
expounded in the Pastoral Letter will be understood by those who
are not themselves Christians? Do they expect that people who do
not believe in Christ or in judgment or in the idea of a covenant
community will be persuaded by opinions about public policy pre-
mised on exactly those ideas? Processes of public debate are sup-
posed to involve genuine engagement, listening, modification of one's
own views in response to others - a deliberative synthesis, in other
words. Do the bishops expect that Christian ideals, such as those
expounded in this booklet, can contribute anything to a synthesis
that, is a well thought-out position in its own right, and not just a
resultant of political vectors? 25 Or is the thought simply that the
Letter will enable Catholics to strengthen themselves as a pressure
group or a voting bloc - and never mind about public discussion -
even though the actual bases of their beliefs remain mysterious or
unintelligible to other participants? What role, in short, do the bish-
ops expect (or what role should we expect) this Pastoral Letter to
play in the democratic process?
This is not an issue the authors of the Letter say very much about.
They point out that in a modern society "it is often difficult to find a
common ground among people with different backgrounds and con-
cerns." 26 In context, this is intended as an observation about the
problems of developing a consensus on economic justice given social
fragmentation, the specialist division of labor in an industrialized
economy, and the "increased emphasis on personal goals and private
interests. 27 Certainly the problem of finding a common ground forjustice amidst an array of mutually opposed or indifferent individual
25. For this as a general condition on political positions, see RONALD M. DWOR-
KIN. LAW's EMPIRE 176-84 (1986): the idea is that even a compromise position in politics
must have the integrity of something which makes sense as a position in its own right.
26. THE LETTER, supra note 1, at 11.
27. Id.
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interests is an important one. The bishops cite the work of Robert
Bellah and his collaborators, Habits of the Heart, to emphasize how
important this is:28 "One of our chief hopes in writing this letter is to
encourage and contribute to the development of this common
ground. ' 29 They neglect, however, the difficulty that their own ef-
forts pose - for the tendency of their proposal is to establish "com-
mon ground" on a basis that many in society will find themselves
unable to accept. In other words, they neglect the possibility that
Catholic participation in public debates about economic justice along
the lines indicated in the Letter might make matters worse, so far as
the achievement of common ground is concerned.
Three other ideas expounded by the bishops contribute in a small
way to our understanding of what they take to be the place of the
Pastoral Letter in public life.
First, they insist that the Letter is not put forward as a matter of
ecclesiastical authority. Though there is constant reference to Papal
pronouncements of various sorts, the tone of the booklet is argumen-
tative rather than ex cathedra. The authors note that some of their
specific recommendations are politically controversial, and they con-
cede that they are matters on which persons of goodwill may
disagree.
As bishops, we do not claim to make these prudential judgments with the
same kind of authority that marks our declarations of principle. But we feel
obliged to teach by example how Christians can undertake concrete analysis
and make specific judgments on economic issues. The Church's teachings
cannot be left at the level of appealing generalities.30
The second idea is the bishops' commitment to ecumenism: they
say they are writing in a tradition of religiously-based concern about
social justice in which thinkers from the Protestant and Jewish com-
munities "have also provided guidance." 31 Specifically, as they de-
velop the biblical basis of their argument, they say: "We also claim
the Hebrew Scriptures as common heritage with our Jewish brothers
and sisters, and we join with them in the quest for an economic life
worthy of the divine revelation we share."3 2 A little later they say:
"We also have much to learn from the strong emphasis in Protestant
28. Id. at 11 n.18. For a recent study of the importance and difficulty of achieving
such a common language and vision, see ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
29. THE LETTER, supra note 1, at 11.
30. Id. at xii.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id. at 16.
traditions on the vocation of lay people in the world and from ecu-
menical efforts to develop an economic ethic that addresses newly
emergent problems."33 This ecumenism, however, has its limits. No
attempt has been made to engage with religious views outside the
Judeo-Christian tradition, and precious little attempt has been made
to say anything about the obvious resonances between the Letter's
conception of social justice and the conceptions developed by secular
academic philosophers such as John Rawls.34
The third idea that is relevant in this connection is the universal-
ism of Catholic faith and teaching on social justice. Theologically-
based requirements can be divided into three classes: (i) those under-
stood as specific to members of a given congregation; eg., to be a
member of the Mormon community one must be prepared to tithe
one's income; (ii) those understood as specific to a given class of per-
sons; e.g., God requires certain things of the Jews as His chosen peo-
ple; and (iii) those understood to be addressed to all men and
women, whether they know or believe that these teachings are of
concern to them or not. Categories (ii) and (iii) involve what are
sometimes referred to as "ascriptive" characteristics: characteristics
important for the purposes of some doctrine that apply to a person
whether he has, in any sense, chosen to exhibit that characteristic or
not. The "catholicism" of the Roman Church places most of its
teachings and requirements in the third category. Even on controver-
sial issues, like abortion and birth control, the Church's teaching is
that every person, not just every Catholic or every Christian, should
refrain from destroying fetuses and refrain from artificially frustrat-
ing what is taken to be the reproductive function of human sexuality.
Such doctrines are intended to be universal in their application
(though of course the Church does not expect that everyone will take
equal notice of them). The same applies, as I understand it, to the
Church's teaching on economic justice. The beliefs that the bishops
expound, the arguments they develop, are intended as arguments
about what humans, as such, owe to one another in the way they use
and share the material resources of the world. The rights and duties
they set out are universal in scope; that is why they can take them-
selves to be contributing to modern debates about human rights.
Again, as things stand, the bishops may expect members of their
own congregation to be more receptive to what they (the bishops)
say than outsiders are. What they say, however, is what they believe
about the duties and rights of all of us in these areas.
33. Id. at 30.
34. I have in mind the similarities between Rawls' "Difference Principle" in JOHN
RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE §13 (1971) and the concern for "the least, the lost, and
the left-out" in THE LETTER, supra note 1, at xv, that characterizes the arguments of the
Pastoral Letter.
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The bishops are, in other words, in the same game as philosophers
who write about justice: they are trying to work out what people owe
to one another, not what Catholics or Christians owe to one another.
If anything, their views are more universal in scope than those of
secular thinkers like Michael Walzer, more universal, indeed, than
the recent views of John Rawls. According to Walzer, social justice
is relative to the meanings and understandings implicit in the life of
each society. There are, he says, no a priori or universal principles:
"Every substantive account of distributive justice is a local ac-
count."135 Walzer infers from this that "[a] given society is just if its
substantive life is lived in a certain way - that is, in a way faithful to
the shared understandings of the members. '3 6 He thinks it would be
nothing short of tyrannical to oppose the local understandings of
caste, gender, or differential status in some society in the name of
universal egalitarian ideals.31 Even John Rawls has toyed with this
parochial line of late. We should not, he says, try to find "a concep-
tion of justice suitable for all societies regardless of their particular
social or historical circumstances." ' Instead, we should "look to our-
selves and to our future, and reflect upon our disputes since, let's say,
the Declaration of Independence. How far the conclusions we reach
are of interest in a wider context is a separate question."39 On this
account, there is no real or transcendent moral order against which
the truth of our judgments can be tested. What justifies a conception
of justice is "its congruence with our deeper understanding of our-
selves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history
and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reason-
able doctrine for us."'40
The universalism of the Pastoral Letter - and of course the tran-
scendent faith on which that universalism is based - is thus a direct
challenge to the relativism of the modern philosophical retreat into
"ourselves and our aspirations" and what is "the most reasonable
doctrine for us."
I have emphasized this contrast between the universalism of the
35. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 314 (1983) (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 313.
37. Id. at 313-14.
38. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in More Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 518
(1980).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 519. See, however, the position articulated most recently in JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 44 (1993): "We turn to political philosophy when our
shared political understandings . . . break down . .. .
Pastoral Letter and the turn towards relativism in recent political
philosophy because it also shows that the problem posed by the Pas-
toral Letter in the context of public debate is not the problem of how
to accommodate those with particular religious preferences. There is
a whole set of problems involving things like whether Sikhs may be
required to doff their turbans and put on helmets when they ride
motorcycles or whether Old Order Amish parents may be required
to give their children an education that meets certain publicly de-
fined standards - problems that concern what the rest of us should
do about certain citizens' special religious scruples and sensitivities.41
That is not the issue we are dealing with here. Instead, we are deal-
ing with a body of teaching that purports to address issues of eco-
nomic justice - which are indisputably issues for and concerning all
of us - on exactly the scale (or at least arguably on exactly the
scale) that those issues need to be addressed.
Together, this ecumenism and universalism provide a basis for
what the bishops take to be the wider appeal of their pamphlet.
Though they say they are writing "first of all, to provide guidance
for members of our own Church as they seek to form their con-
sciences about economic matters, 42 they add that they also "seek
the cooperation and support of those who do not share our faith or
tradition. The common bond of humanity that links all persons is the
source of our belief that the country can attain a renewed public
moral vision." '43
III
I said that the Pastoral Letter is addressed to Catholics, not only
in their capacity as economic agents (buyers, sellers, workers and
managers, hirers and firers), and not only in their capacity as citi-
zens, but also "in legislative chambers. 44 The implication is that
Catholic Congressmen, 'Catholic officials, Catholic judges, Catholic
governors, even a Catholic President, should bear these specifically
biblical and Christian teachings in mind as they exercise the powers
entrusted to them by the people.
That implication arouses well-known opposition in liberal constitu-
tional circles inasmuch as it involves some blurring of the line be-
tween church and state, a violation of the duty on those who exercise
legislative, judicial, and executive power to do so in a way that is, as
far as possible, neutral among the various religious professions of the
41. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. THE LETTER, supra note 1, at 13.
43. Id. at 13-14.
44. Id. at vi.
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citizens.45
Here is one suggestion that might be offered to meet that opposi-
tion. Perhaps some of the sting could be drawn from the issue if the
bishops were to address themselves only to Catholics qua ordinary
citizens, and to refrain from arguing that biblical, papal, and theo-
logical teachings should guide the actions and deliberations of those
in public office. I think, however, that any such distinction would be
hopeless for two reasons.
First, although we are accustomed to distinguishing between'ordi-
nary citizens and public officials, part of the ideology of democracy
is that such a distinction is ultimately, in the end, misguided. Citi-
zens are not just subjects and observers so far as public political life
is concerned. They are (or they are supposed to be) active partici-
pants. Indeed, public policies ultimately have whatever legitimacy
they possess (and public officials ultimately have whatever authority
they possess) only by reference to the wishes and decisions of mil-
lions of ordinary people on matters such as those addressed by the
Pastoral Letter.46
One way of seeing this is to think of the voter as an official, pro
tern, when he enters the polling booth. As a voter, he is entrusted
with a certain amount of power to make public decisions. The way in
which he - and the millions of others who are so entrusted - de-
cides to exercise that power will determine how the nation acts on
issues of great moment. Of course, the amount of power each voter
has is quite small: he has, in the polling booth, no more power than
any other voter, and there are, as I said, millions of them. Still, on
certain issues, nothing but the individual decisions of voters deter-
mine what public policy will be. Voters in California, for example,
can make policy decisions directly through referendum; and even in
ordinary elections, citizens are determining together, through the ag-
gregation and counting of their individual decisions, who will occupy
high office and what their policy orientations will be. Cynics in the
political science profession may attempt to minimize what voters can
45. For the best account of such opposition, see KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
46. On certain other matters, such as civil rights and liberties, public policy
secures its legitimacy from the Constitution and from court decisions that bypass or over-
ride democratic mandates. The notion that public policy on matters of social and eco-
nomic justice secures its legitimacy through normal processes of democratic
representation and accountability, rather than through interpretations of specific clauses
in the Bill of Rights, has long been part of the American political system. In other words,
the Pastoral Letter addresses itself to matters that are regarded as properly in the do-
main of majoritarian decision making.
do. But it is the theory, the aspiration, and occasionally the reality of
our political system that power is exercised through the ballot box.
This has important consequences for any putative distinction be-
tween citizens and officials. Certainly public officials have wide pow-
ers and should accept a commensurate level of moral responsibility.
But the same applies to citizens. Acting collectively as voters, they
can inflict great harm on minorities, or on one another; they can
make the difference between peace and war; they can leave needy
persons overseas languishing in famine if they make it clear that
they will vote out of office anyone who increases foreign aid. They
have this power - the theory of democracy requires that they
should have it - and they are therefore required, morally, to accept
whatever responsibilities go along with its exercise. This is particu-
larly important on issues of social justice and social welfare - for,
again, those who depend on the state for food, shelter, and basic
well-being depend, in the last analysis, on the voters. Persons such as
the homeless, the poor, the sick, the old, the very young, the unem-
ployed, and the hungry are, so to speak, at the mercy of their fellow
citizens on election day. Indeed, they are as much at their mercy as
they are at the mercy of the professional officials who make ordinary
decisions about welfare payments - perhaps more so, because the
voters are permitted to make new decisions on their own initiative
whereas, in theory at least, the professional officials are not. If the
voters decide to roll back property taxes, or to vote out of office any-
one who proposes to increase the fiscal demands made upon them,
they are in effect deciding that nothing is to be done, or that less is
to be done, to assist people in need. So, if an argument can be made
in favor of officials not exercising their political power on the basis
of their religious convictions, consistency requires that the same ar-
gument be applied also to voters.41
If you like, voters can be thought of as members of a huge jury.
An ordinary person may pick and choose those whom he spends time
with, or falls in love with, or gives money to, or goes drinking with,
on any criteria that appeal to him. When he is sworn in as a juror,
47. See DWORKIN, supra note 25. Dworkin develops this argument with regard to
decisions in the economic sphere. Some thinkers - particularly utilitarians - take the
view that all our decisions should be guided by impartial criteria of the general good.
Most of us do not accept that pervasive responsibility. We think that we are
normally free, morally as well as legally, to prefer our own interests and
projects, and those of a small number of other people to whom we feel special
associative responsibilities and ties, in the day-to-day decisions we make using
our own property.
Id. at 292. We do not think that we have any general duty, he says, to treat all other
members of the community with equal care and concern in everything we do. Id. at 296.
"But we believe our government, the community personified, does have this duty, and we
might hope to find in this pervasive public responsibility some explanation of why we as
individuals sometimes have that duty as well." Id.
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however, those preferences must be left behind. He may not acquit a
defendant simply because he likes the look of him, or convict him
because he is not a member of a race from which he would want his
daughter to select a husband. As a juror he is, for the time being, a
public official, exercising the power of the whole people, and imparti-
ality is a responsibility that is required of him in that "office" which
may not be required of him in ordinary life. Those who believe in a
separation of church and state will say that, as a juror, the ordinary
citizen may not appeal to specifically religious convictions in his de-
liberations - for example, convictions about original sin, predestina-
tion, the nature of guilt, the duty of forgiveness, the exclusive penal
prerogatives of the Lord, or the peculiarly defined heinousness of
certain offenses. He must make his decisions based on the public cri-
teria of law supplied to him, not on the basis of his own religious
faith. I am arguing, then, that the voter too should be restricted, if a
doctrine about the inappropriateness of official appeals to religious
convictions can be sustained. Given such a doctrine, the voter has no
right to engage his specifically religious convictions in the polling
booth. As much as the juror, he is exercising the power of a responsi-
ble office, and he must take care that he does so in a way that is
impartial and responsive to the public character of his decision.
The bishops, of course, do not draw this distinction. In their view,
a Catholic is required to show the equal concern that they recom-
mend for the needs of others whether he is signing a bill in a gover-
nor's office, or voting in an election, or giving alms at church, or
deciding what sort of automobile to buy. The commitments of the
Christian faith, on their account, are pervasive in a way that the
special duties and responsibilities of public office are not. What I am
arguing, however, is. that if we do think special duties and responsi-
bilities pertaining to the exercise of political power exist - as most
liberal theorists do - and if they include anything like a duty of
religious neutrality, then that duty applies to ordinary citizens acting
in their capacity as voters as well.48
So, if Catholics "living their faith" as legislators is a problem,
then Catholics "living their faith" as voters is also a problem. The
question about the place of the Pastoral Letter in public life cannot
be avoided by concentrating the duty of religious neutrality pecu-
liarly on officials. We are all officials in a democracy.
48. Cf. Id. at 295-96.
I said earlier that there were two reasons for doubting that a dis-
tinction could be drawn between the role of the citizen and the role
of the official so far as appeals to explicitly religious considerations
were concerned. The second reason has to do with the character of
decision making by officials who have made politics their profession:
I have in mind not only professional politicians such as governors,
representatives, and presidents, but also nonpartisan officials and, in
particular, judges.
Clearly, there ought to be continuity between whatever discourse
is appropriate among the people and whatever discourse is appropri-
ate among those whom they elect. We expect elected officials to, in
some sense, represent the views of their constituents; we think that in
normal politics they should take notice of and be sensitive to what
the people are saying; and we believe that they should be made peri-
odically accountable to their constituents for what they have done to
determine whether they should continue to hold office.
Political theorists have sometimes naively imagined that represen-
tation could be just like delegation. The representative would simply
report and act on the views of his constituents, even though he might
not hold those views himself.49 On this approach, there might indeed
be a discontinuity between what citizens may permissibly act upon.
It might, accordingly, be permissible for citizens to take religious
views into account in forming their views on social justice in a way
that would not be permissible for representatives. The latter's job
would be simply to convey accurate views about what the citizens
believe about social justice (including, if necessary, what the citizens
believe for religious reasons). Representatives, on this approach,
would be simply neutral transmission belts.
But, of course, that vision of representation is hopeless. For one
thing, we value a system of representation in which the representa-
tives are not mere hirelings, but are themselves drawn from the ac-
tive ranks of the very constituency they claim to represent. For
another thing, we think representatives should respond sometimes to
the wishes and concerns of all their constituents, not just of the larg-
est bloc that can be seen as holding a specific view. Above all, we
understand that representing a view is not just reporting it, but
working with it, and applying and elaborating it in ways that its
original authors may not have foreseen. This is not just Edmund
Burke's famous insistence on the autonomy of the representative:
"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judg-
ment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to
49. The example most often cited is Karl Marx's vision of the Paris Commune as
the forerunner of socialist democracy in THE CIVIL WARS IN FRANCE (1870) excerpted
in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 542 (David McLellan ed., 1977).
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your opinion." 50 My point is that one cannot represent a view in the
complex circumstances of modern life, even with the most demo-
cratic will in the world, except by holding it and thinking it through
and interpreting it from the inside, as it were, as though one were
one of its authors - even though one's title to represent it is based
on the fact that the view has been authored, in part, by others. I
cannot represent socialist views simply by parroting the socialist
opinions of my constituents. I can do so only by thinking and dis-
cussing as a socialist; and the same is true for all political creeds.
Once again, therefore, the discontinuity between ordinary citizens
and political officials cannot be sustained. Even as their representa-
tive, indeed especially as their representative, the professional politi-
cian must be able to engage in the same sort of deliberations as the
voters to" whom he is accountable.
Not all public officials, however, are supposed to be representa-
tives. What about judges? Surely, it will be said, certain constraints
exist on what a judge may take into account in his decision making
that do not apply to the ordinary citizen. There are such constraints
- but the matter needs to be stated carefully.
The judge in his decision making is constrained by two duties in
particular that do not apply to the voter. He has, first, a certain role
to play in a functionally articulated system: the legislature's duty is
to pass laws, and the judge's duty is to apply those laws to particular
cases as conscientiously as he can. He must think of himself as
bound in his decision making by what the legislature has done in the
way that the ordinary voteroneed not. Though both, of course, must
obey the law, the ordinary citizen may exercise his power qua voter
in favor of a radical change in legislation, while a judge qua judge
may never do this (apart from the exceptional circumstance of legis-
lation he believes to be unconstitutional). Secondly, the judge has an
institutional duty to play his part, along with his brethren on the
bench, in articulating a coherent body of law; he must follow prece-
dent, and he is subject to all the constraints that flow from what
Ronald Dworkin has referred to as the value of "integrity."5 1 Once
again, this is not a duty that burdens the ordinary citizen.
Although these constraints indicate ways in which judicial deci-
sion making differs from decision making by other officials, including
50. THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND BURKE 109 (Ian Hampsher-Monk
ed., 1987) (quoting Burke's November 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol on being
elected).
51. See DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 176 (1986).
voters, they do not add up to a requirement that the judge qua judge
should never think like an ordinary citizen. In a hard case, the judge
may have to make a decision about the rights and responsibilities of
the parties facing him, without any determinate guidance from ei-
ther legislation or precedent. The situation may itself be unprece-
dented or the legal sources ambiguous. In this case, the judge
evidently has no choice but to make his decision in roughly the same
way as those to whose decisions he would ordinarily defer should
make theirs. If the precedents give him no assistance, he must create
a new precedent; if the statutes are ambiguous he must, so to speak,
write a more definitive statute to deal with this particular case. He
must take his decision, in other words, simply on the basis of what is
right and just to do; and in doing so he will be engaged in exactly
the sort of enquiry that a responsible citizen should be engaged in
when he makes his decision as a voter about what legislative mea-
sures would be right and just and thus deserving of his support.
It is, of course, important not to exaggerate the judge's autonomy.
As Ronald Dworkin has argued, it will seldom if ever be true that
the extant statutes and precedents offer no guidance at all.52 Even in
the hardest case, the predicament will present itself to the judge as
one of interpreting whatever legal materials have a bearing on the
case, rather than as one of utterly untrammelled discretion. But as
Dworkin has also argued, interpretation itself involves (though it is
not exhausted by) the making of moral judgments about what it
would be just and right to do. If two or more competing interpreta-
tions of the legal materials exist, and if neither can be disqualified on
grounds of either integrity or institutional deference,
[t]hen he [the judge] must choose between eligible interpretations by asking
which shows the community's structure of institutions and decisions - its
public standards as a whole - in a better light from the standpoint of polit-
ical morality. His own moral and political convictions are now directly
engaged.5 3
In the end, the judge's position is not much different from what we
said earlier about the representative. To represent the views of a con-
stituency one must engage with those views as an active participant,
extending them, following them where they lead, arguing them
through, interpreting them, applying them, and so on. Such a process
is inextricably linked with moral judgment: to think that the view
one is representing makes most sense when extended this way to
cover an unanticipated application, is to think that so extended it
will be a better principle than if it were understood in some other
way. The judge reasons in a very similar way: in deciding to inter-
pret the legal materials thus to dispose of the case before him, he
52. See RONALD DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
53. DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 256.
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argues that the materials so interpreted look better, from the moral
point of view, than they would if given a different interpretation. To
that extent, the judge too is reaching a decision about the difference
between a good or just society and one that is less good or less just.
When this aspect of Dworkin's jurisprudence is criticized in the
literature, he is often represented as saying that judges should be-
come moral philosophers. Mark Tushnet, for example, complains
that "Dworkin's methodological prescription simply tells us to rely
on moral philosophy [but] does not tell us what moral philosophy to
rely on." '54 This is misleading. Dworkin's position, and the position of
common sense, is that a point will come in judicial decision making
when the judge must simply make a moral judgment of his own, in
his own voice, the best way he knows how. He does not eo ipso be-
come a moral philosopher, unless we extend the latter category to
cover anyone who tries to think hard about moral problems. It makes
more sense to adjust the categories from the other direction: moral
and political philosophers are simply doing systematically, profes-
sionally, and at leisure what judges and other officials must do under
a deadline every day. Neither activity - neither that of the philoso-
pher nor that of the judge - differs, in essence, from the thinking
and decision making of the ordinary person addressing matters of
civic importance. For all three, a time comes when he must think
about and enter a value judgment in his own voice. Unless he does
that, he will not be able to complete the task assigned to him,
whether it is teaching, interpreting legal sources, or choosing for
whom to vote. In all of this I am assuming, of course, that it is in-
cumbent on voters to ask themselves directly what is right and just
for their society to do. I am assuming that it is not permissible for
them to simply to consult their own interests in exercising the power
assigned to them. Once we acknowledge the unavoidable place of
moral judgment in the activity of the judge, we must recognize that
he is pro tanto in the same game as the ordinary citizen. So, any-
thing appropriate for the citizen to take into account in exercising
his political power is appropriate for the judge and for other officials
to take into account, to the extent that they face moral choices in the
exercise of theirs.55
54. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 139 (1988). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
11 (1991).
55. I am obliged to Michael Perry's article in this Symposium for some of the
formulations in this paragraph.
Let me circle back, then, to the original problem. We have seen
that if ordinary people may properly take documents like the bish-
ops' Pastoral Letter into account as they discharge their civic respon-
sibilities, officials (such as representatives and judges) must be
permitted to do so, as well. But the position thus far is a conditional
one: if ordinary people may take this into account, then officials may
too. We now have to address the issue directly of whether the Pas-
toral Letter actually is the sort of thing that citizens (or anyone)
may take appropriately into account in the responsible exercise of
their political decision making.
IV
The first thing to say in answering that question is that it may be
a mistake to focus purely on voting and other forms of decision mak-
ing. It is important that the Pastoral Letter is seen as a fabric of
argument and not simply a list of things to do or vote for. The docu-
ment is intended for "public discussion;" 8 Catholics are called on to
use their "voices" as well as their votes;57 its aim is "to articulate a
moral perspective in the general societal and political debate that
surrounds these questions." 8
One may think that this gives rise to a particular problem. In prin-
ciple, there is no difficulty in counting a vote cast on grounds of
Catholic principle or biblical teaching; there is no problem for
weighing such a vote against that of a follower of Islam, a Mormon,
or a secular atheist. If it's a "Yea," it outweighs precisely one
"Nay" vote, whether it was inspired by the Gospel, the Koran, A
Theory of Justice, or John Lennon's Imagine. There may be doubts
about the appropriateness of a person's deciding on religious grounds
how to exercise his vote, but there are no special or technical
problems of commensurability at the ballot box.
Public debate, however, is different. One's aim there is to talk to
other people, to convince, persuade, communicate, to open one's
mind to other perspectives, hear what others are saying, remind
them of things they may have overlooked, exchange experiences,
proverbs, images, and insights. In deliberation people talk and listen:
each holds himself ready to change his mind on an issue, in whole or
in part, and each expects others to contribute in a similar spirit. The
great hope of the democratic ideal is that reason can be exercised
publicly in this way.
But how, it may be asked, can this conversation proceed if two
56. THE LETrER, supra note 1, at vii.
57. Id. at xv.
58. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
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people are addressing one another from utterly disparate perspec-
tives? You are arguing, on the one hand, about human rights and
needs, about equality and market socialism; I am arguing, on the
other hand, about the significance of the Incarnation for our
thoughts about the poor, about the Holy Ghost and His presence in
the world, and about the needs we have that go beyond the needs of
the body. How can we make contact in argument? How can we con-
vince each other? How can my contribution be synthesized with any-
thing you have said? The worry is that if we allow religious views
onto the stage of secular politics, we will turn the public forum into
a babel of mutually unintelligible and incommensurable
metaphysics.
In my opinion, this difficulty is often exaggerated; we should not
underestimate the human capacity to conduct conversations even in
these unpropitious circumstances. People often surprise us, and an
advance warning of mutual incomprehensibility is, in many cases, an
enticement and a prelude to fascination with what the other has to
say rather than a prelude to unintelligibility. We are too easily
scared by what Karl Popper has called "the myth of the frame-
work."59 We think, along Wittgenstenian lines, that people have to
share something before they can converse: "If language is to be a
means of communication there must be agreement not only in defini-
tions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.""0 Again,
though, how thin that necessary background turns out to be is sur-
prising. In any case, it is worth pausing to review some of the models
or conceptions of public deliberation that are involved in the demo-
cratic tradition to see whether the worry about mutual comprehen-
sion is well-grounded.
The earliest well worked-out conception of public deliberation is
that of Aristotle, in his discussion of whether political power should
be vested in the few citizens of great wisdom and virtue or in the
hands of the many:
There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be
of a good quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they
may surpass - collectively and as a body, although not individually - the
ability of the few best. Feasts to which many contribute may excel those
provided at one man's expense. In the same way, when there are many [who
59. KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
(1972).
60. LuDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 88e, T 242 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1953); see also the extensive discussion in SABINA LOVIBOND, REALISM
AND IMAGINATION IN ETHICS (1983).
contribute to the process of deliberation], each can bring his share of good-
ness and moral prudence; and when all meet together the people may thus
become something in the nature of a single person who - as he has many
feet, many hands, and many senses - may also have many of the qualities of
character and intelligence."'
That is why Aristotle takes it as the mark of man's political nature
that he has been endowed with the faculty of speech.62 Each can
communicate to another experiences and insights that complement
those the other already possesses. When this happens in dense inter-
action throughout a community, the group as a whole can attain a
degree of wisdom and practical knowledge that surpasses even that
of the most excellent individual member.
In order for this model to work, each contribution must be made
in a way that is, so to speak, apt to be received by other members of
the community. As Thucydides put it, "One who forms a judgment
on any point, but cannot explain himself clearly to the people, might
as well have never thought at all on the subject." 3 When a speaker
makes his contribution, listeners must be able to understand it, and
relate it to their own views, in such a way that they can either ex-
amine the critical confrontation that it poses and work out what side
to come down on, or synthesize into a modified view the grain of
truth or insight that it offers. Thus, there is a connection between the
Aristotelian model of public deliberation and the idea of shared
modes of reasoning, a common matrix of public understanding on
which various views of various people can be laid out, compared,
contrasted, and synthesized.
A second slightly different model of public deliberation is
presented by John Stuart Mill:
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the
reconciling and combining of opposites that very few have minds sufficiently
capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to cor-
rectness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between
combatants fighting under hostile banners."
Here, the suggestion is that people simply fling their views and opin-
ions into the public forum of ideas and, whether others understand
them precisely or not, they will have their effect, and the truth will
emerge by a sort of invisible-hand process, analogous to that by
which Adam Smith thought efficiency and prosperity would emerge
from the operation of the market.65 The difference between Mill's
61. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 123 bk. III, ch. 11, 1281b (E. Barker trans., 1946).
62. Id. at 5, bk. I, ch. 2, 1253a.
63. RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 83 (1983) (quoting THUCYDIDES, His-
TORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, bk. II, ch. 6).
64. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 58 (Curran V. Shields ed., 1956).
65. Those who use the "market" analogy never explain, of course, why truth is
analogous to a value like efficiency which can, in principle, be secured by invisible-hand
processes, rather than to a value like justice, which everyone agrees cannot be secured in
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model and Aristotle's is that Mill does not assume that each contri-
bution is being carefully taken on board by each person and brought
by him into relation with his own view before he sends his modified
opinion out to engage with the views of others in a similar way. For
Mill's model to work, it is less important that the competing ideas be
intellectually commensurable. Who cares if a specifically biblical
doctrine is flung up against the secular views of, say, a Robert
Nozick or a P.J. O'Rourke? The ideas will have their effect on one
another, and something better will (or may) emerge in the clash,
even though the "adjustment" between the two views has not been
made by any "single mind."
Those who have expressed concern about the role of specifically
religious views in public debate 6 have, I think, rightly assumed that
the first model, rather than the second, is the model we should be
interested in. Even if Mill's approach better represents the chaotic
reality of post-modern "debate" in a society like our own, the Aristo-
telian model captures at least some of the aspirations for public rea-
son that have been the hallmark of liberal democratic thought. Even
if public debate does take place "by the rough process of a struggle
between combatants fighting under hostile banners," still, as they
participate, people often make their contributions as though they ex-
pected others to listen to them, to compare them calmly with their
own views, and to make the adjustments that are necessary to ac-
commodate whatever grain of truth they involve. Respecting this as-
piration is important, even if it is honored more in the breach than in
the observance.
Still, Mill's model is worth bearing in mind, if only to alert us
against too narrow a view of what must be the case, if public delib-
eration is to take place. John Rawls offers what, in my opinion, is an
overly narrow conception of the matrix of public reason, suggesting
that it must always proceed from some consensus - "from premises
that we and others recognize as true, or as reasonable for the pur-
pose of reaching a working agreement. 67 He suggests that public
deliberation be limited to "the shared methods of, and the public
that way.
66. E.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 226 (1987); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice:
Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REVIEW 1019 (1990).
67. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1987).
knowledge available to, common sense, and the procedures and con-
clusions of science when these are not controversial."6' 8 What this
conception seems to rule out is the novel or disconcerting move in
political argumentation: the premise that no one has ever thought of
before, but which, once stated, sounds plausible or interesting.
Rawls' conception seems to assume an inherent limit in the human
capacity for imagination and creativity in politics, implying as it
does that something counts as a legitimate move in public reasoning
only to the extent that it latches onto existing premises that every-
body already shares.
In responding to that view, we need not go as far as Mill in open-
ing up the parameters of public debate; we need not say that some-
thing counts as a respectable contribution just in case it is likely to
have an effect on the existing consensus. We may want to insist that
citizens address one another as thinkers and reasoners, not merely as
conscious or subliminal recipients of post-modern culture. Still it is a
mistake to suppose, as Rawls does, that I can engage with another as
a thinker only if we share some major premise and some mode of
reasoning from it.
I believe that it is this overly cautious approach to public reason
that has led Rawls into the rather narrow relativism of some of his
recent work in political philosophy:
We assume, then, that public justification on questions of political and so-
cial justice rests on some public consensus, that is, on an agreement in citi-
zens' shared beliefs ... and in their considered judgments of justice (more
generally, their considered judgments relating to all the political values the
political conception expresses). Justification is always addressed to some
particular group of persons .... What constitutes the most reasonable ba-
sis of public justification for one society may not be a basis of justification
for another; and [the] same holds for the same society at different times.69
This is too cautious. It suggests that justificatory moves must always
connect with an existent consensus, with the stock of ideas already
"implicit in the political culture" of our society.70 In fact, justifica-
tory consensus may be invented in or constituted by a political dis-
course that does not presuppose or assume its existence. Moves may
be made in political argument that bear no relation to existing con-
ventions or commonly held opinions, but which nevertheless gain a
foothold as soon as they are considered and discussed by persons
with open minds.
If we assume, moreover, that a creative openness to new ideas, and
68. Id. at 8.
69. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Briefer Restatement (1989) (manuscript
on file with author).
70. John Rawls, Remarks on a Political Conception of Justice (Aug. 1991) (man-
uscript on file with author and prepared for APSA panel The Idea of a Political Concep-
tion of Justice).
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a willingness to come to terms with the unfamiliar, are universal
human traits, this possibility may actually contradict (not just miti-
gate) the relativism of Rawls' appeal to consensus. From this per-
spective, we might want to take seriously Mill's opinion that people
actually have an interest in having their most cherished and consid-
ered judgments challenged, and in being disconcerted and discom-
fited by the new and the unfamiliar - or even by the clearly wrong
- in public debate.71
The other point to note in this regard is that any putative consen-
sus is always going to be partial and indeterminate in an actually
existing society. The most familiar deliverance of common sense will
be denied by some; the best-established scientific results (particularly
social scientific results) will be contested. If we want to stick with
the idea of a consensus as the grounding of public reason - and
whether we can is not at all clear once we see that there is no pro-
position comprised in any putative consensus that is not contradicted
by someone - still, if we want to stick with that idea, we are going
to have to loosen it a little. Either'the extent of what counts as a
consensus among the population (everyone? a majority?), or the no-
tion of what makes something a consensus (agreement on details?
agreement only on the basics?), will have to be relaxed - and prob-
ably both. We are likely to end up talking about views that are
shared by "many" or "most," rather than "all." Furthermore, shar-
ing a view is more likely to be understood in terms of some loose
relation like Wittgenstenian "family resemblance" than in terms of
the rigid specification of a set of agreed propositions. Rawls talks
often of "overlapping consensus" - some common ground between
rival philosophical, ideological, and religious world views 2.7 But any
such specification of common ground, is likely to be, at best, indeter-
minate, for several sets of views may exist, each of which has a claim
to be regarded as "the public consensus," if anything is to be so
regarded.
With all this in mind, it may be harder to rule something out as a
possible or as an appropriate contribution to public debate than the
Rawlsian picture supposes. We therefore have reason to be cautious
about Rawls' insistence that the idea of public reason "excludes
comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines" in favor of "the
71. MILL, supra note 64, at 19-67; see also Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value
of Moral Distress, 25 PoL. STUD. 410 (1987).
72. See RAWLS, supra note 40, at 133-73.
plain truths now common and available to citizens generally."'
V
Much of what Rawls and others say about the exigencies of public
reason is based on concerns about the possibility of public debate.
That is what I have been focusing on: what does a view or an opinion
or a reason have to be like - how must it relate to views that people
already hold - in order to work as a contribution to public debate?
A second issue he raises, though, concerns not the possibility of gen-
uine debate, but the fairness or (in his sense) the reasonableness of a
particular contribution.74
For example, in A Theory of Justice, he argues that any limita-
tions that are imposed on liberty of conscience must be based on a
"reasonable expectation" that failing to impose the limit will be det-
rimental to public order. "This expectation," Rawls says, "must be
based on evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all. It must
be supported by ordinary observations and modes of thought (includ-
ing the methods of rational scientific inquiry where these are not
controversial) which are generally recognized as correct.1 75
Now this reliance on what can be established and known by everyone is
itself founded on the principles of justice. It implies no particular metaphys-
ical doctrine or theory of knowledge .... It represents an agreement to
limit liberty only by reference to a common knowledge and understanding
of the world .... On the other hand, a departure from generally recog-
nized ways of reasoning would involve a privileged place for the views of
some over others .... 76
This argument, too, will run into difficulties if what is required is an
appeal to views that are shared literally by everyone in a society. We
will all be silenced if we are to say nothing or appeal to no consider-
ation in politics unless we are sure that the view is "common knowl-
edge" in this literal sense.
The requirement of fairness, however, need not be so exacting. In-
stead of saying positively that we must be sure that a reason is part
of an existing consensus before we can appeal to it, we may phrase
the doctrine as a narrower, negative claim. We must not appeal to
considerations which we know, or have good reason to believe, are
not shared in the society. Religious considerations fall into this cate-
gory, for it is common knowledge in our society that no agreement
may reasonably be expected on matters of religion. We must, Rawls
says, take into account what he calls the "burdens of reason" - the
73. Rawls, supra note 69 (manuscript at 65-66).
74. See Rawls, supra note 38, at 528 for his definition of reasonableness.
75. RAWLS, supra note 34, at 213.
76. Id.
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features of mind and inquiry that make disagreement about compre-
hensive world views more or less unavoidable. Any appeal to a reli-
gious point in public argument is thus an appeal to a consideration
which inevitably, and in the nature of things, we cannot expect
others to accept.
Thus, if it is said that outside the church there is no salvation, and hence a
constitutional regime cannot be accepted unless it is unavoidable, . . . the
appropriate reply is that the doctrine is unreasonable: it proposes to use the
public's political power - a power in which all citizens have an equal share
forcibly to impose a viev affecting constitutional essentials about which
many citizens as reasonable persons, given what we may call the burdens of
reason . are bound to differ uncompromisingly in judgment.7
The image in this passage, though, is misleading. Rawls writes as
if each comment that is made in public debate is nothing more than
a proposal to use public power to forcibly impose something on ev-
eryone else so that what we have to evaluate, in each case, an imme-
diate coercive proposal.-That is seldom what we are faced with.
Instead, a religious doctrine is likely to be put forward as one contri-
bution among others in a debate on how political power is to be used.
In that context, it is much less clear whether there is anything unfair
or unreasonable about such an intervention. A contribution may be
put forward as something for one's fellow citizens to ponder and con-
sider along with the other views that they are listening to, something
for them to take into account. What they make of it may be left up
to them.
In any case, we think it part of the point of public deliberation to
expose citizens and other decision makers to perspectives and exper-
iences with which they are initially unfamiliar. Only on the basis of
such exposure is there any reason to believe - on either Aristotelian
or Mill-ian grounds - that the decision which results at the end of
the deliberations will be any improvement over the prejudices with
which the people went into the forum.78 Only on this basis can we
expect the participants in dialogue themselves to be improved by the
exposure.7 9
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they
are bound to disagree - and how could any doctrine of public delib-
eration preclude that? - it does not follow that such exposure is
pointless or oppressive. For one thing, it is important for people to be
77. Rawls, supra note 70 (manuscript at 133).
78. See supra notes 61 & 64 and accompanying text.
79. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
69-80, ch. III (1991).
acquainted with the views that others hold. Even more important,
however, is the possibility that my own view may be improved, in its
subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphysics that I
am initially inclined to reject. I do not mean, now, Mill's point about
the bracing benefits of vigorously combatting error.80 I mean to draw
attention to an experience we all have had at one time or another, of
having argued with someone whose world view was quite at odds
with our own, and of having come away thinking, "I'm sure he's
wrong, and I can't follow much of it, but, still, it makes you think
.... ." The prospect of losing that sort of effect in public discourse
is, frankly, frightening - terrifying, even, if we are to imagine it
being replaced by a form of "deliberation" that, in the name of
"fairness" or "reasonableness" (or worse still, "balance") consists of
bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted without ques-
tion on all sides. That is to imagine open-ended public debate re-
duced to the formal trivia of American television networks.
VI
What was said in the previous sections might apply to any reli-
gious or other philosophically contentious intervention. We do not
have (and we should not have) so secure a notion of public consen-
sus, or such stringent requirements of fairness in debate, as to ex-
clude any view from having its effect in the marketplace of ideas.
But there are also some quite specific reasons for not excluding
from our deliberations on economic justice religious ideas that hail
from the particular tradition embodied in the Catholic bishops' Let-
ter. Much of what passes for disciplined secular thought about the
morality of private property and economic justice stems from a tra-
dition of political thought that has its roots in ideas of natural right,
natural law, and the sanctity of the human person. Those of us who
have lost our faith properly seek formulations for these ideas that
eschew phrases like "sanctity" and references, explicit or implicit, to
a divine creator and law-giver. It is possible that we shall not suc-
ceed in that enterprise. Perhaps it would be wiser to replace the
whole apparatus of that philosophical tradition with something that
is secular in its provenance, as well as its phraseology, than to perse-
vere with an ethic of natural law that has lost its law-giver, or a
teleology that has lost its telos. This is a suggestion made by G.E.M.
Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre, among others. 81 But even if we
80. MILL, supra note 64, at 43-55.
81. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 1-21
(1981) and G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958). Their
claim is a radical one and goes to the heart of our moral concepts - including the
elementary concept of a "moral requirement" - as well as to the content of particular
views in the natural law tradition. We know, for example, that the notion of a moral
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reject that suggestion and persevere with what is broadly a secular
philosophy of social justice based on natural rights, still we should be
more modest than we often are about our ability to (re)construct
such a theory and to work out what, exactly, in its depths and its
implications, it should involve.
To take one well-known example: such a theory will need a con-
ception of the value of human life and a way of determining whether
beings such as human fetuses are to be regarded as persons for the
purpose of attributing human rights. If the abortion debate has
shown anything, it has shown that we both need, and have not yet
secured, such a conception for the purposes of secular political argu-
mentation.82 I am not suggesting that we just take over some better-
worked-out religious conception. But the idea that we can afford
simply to ignore the contents of all religious conceptions of the per-
son, the idea that we should abandon any hope of deriving clues or
intimations from those traditions as to how to construct a secular
conception and how to relate it to other ideas about virtue, value,
and duty - and that we should do so because those sources of clues
are controversial and, indeed, implicated in the very controversy
(about abortion) that we are addressing - all this strikes me as the
opposite of wisdom. The work of writers like John Finnis, Germain
Grisez, and Charles Larmore is indicative of evidence of the value -
to all of us - of certain philosophers' being able to bridge the gap
between secular and religious argumentation. This kind of value
has little to do with whether we agree with either their premises or
their conclusions, and everything to do with the way in which en-
gagement with their thoughts helps to deepen our own.
Personhood and abortion are obvious issues to talk about in this
regard. However, I want to illustrate the point more extensively and
more aptly - in the light of the issues on which the Pastoral Letter
requirement used to be linked to the notion of a requirer, and that while, "it is a natural
result that the concepts of 'obligation,' of being bound or required as by a law, should
remain though they had lost their root," (Anscombe at 6) still we should not expect that
such a hangover will not pose certain perplexities for us in our philosophizing about eth-
ics. "Moral requirement" is like the grin left after the Cheshire cat has disappeared. It
is, as Anscombe points out, "as if the notion 'criminal' were to remain when criminal law
and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten." Id.
82. For an engaging account of the role of religious thought in the abortion contro-
versy, see RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, Eu-
THANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 68-101 (1993).
83. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); GERMAIN
GRISEz, ABORTION; THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS (1970); CHARLES
LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987).
is focused - by referring to the current state of the modern discus-
sion of property in liberal political thought.
Alan Ryan begins his book Property and Political Theory by say-
ing "[s]tudents of theories of property rightly spend a lot of time in
the company of Locke. ' 84 The widespread discussion of property en-
titlement in recent years initiated by Robert Nozick 5 constantly and
obsessively returns to Chapter Five of Locke's Second Treatise of
Government. The currency of phrases like "Lockean proviso" and
"'mixing one's labor" bears witness to the centrality of Locke's dis-
cussion in modern debates about these matters.
Yet Locke's discussion begins in terms that should be quite prob-
lematic from the point of view of Rawlsian public reason: "God, who
hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason
to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience." 8
His account is full of assertions like "[n]othing was made by God for
Man to spoil or destroy, ' 87 and "[i]f such a consent as that was
necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had
given him.""8 As Alasdair MacIntyre once remarked, the Second
Treatise - usually taken as the foundation of modern liberal
thought - is so riddled with theological argumentation as to make it
arguably unteachable on constitutional grounds in the public schools
of the United States. 9
It is tempting to dismiss the references to God in Locke's discus-
sion of property as a theological veneer, easily removable, without
loss, from the central arguments of the Chapter. Indeed, the theolog-
ical references do, in fact, fade out after paragraph thirty-five, and
whole chunks of the argument (e.g., paragraphs thirty-six through
fifty-one) are conducted in purely secular terms. But it is a mistake
to think that we can translate the theological conceptions simply or
straightforwardly out of the Lockean theory and replace them every-
where with secularized versions.
Consider, for example, the issue of whether property owners are
obliged by natural law to share their wealth with the poor. Locke's
position on this is well-known:
[W]e know God hath not left one Man so to the Mercy of another, that he
may starve him if he please: God the Lord and Father of all, has given no
one of his Children such a Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of
84. ALAN RYAN. PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 14 (1984).
85. ROBERT NozICK. ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 149-275 (1987).
86. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, 26, at 286 (Peter Laslett
ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
87. Id. % 31, at 290.
88. Id. 28, at 288.
89. Alasdair Maclntyre, Carlyle Lectures at the University of Oxford (1982) (this
citation is based on my memory of the lectures that I attended).
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this World, but that he has given his needy Brother a Right to the Surplus-
age of his Goods; so that it cannot justly be denyed him, when his pressing
Wants call for it.9'
We might rephrase this as follows: "A needy person has a right to
the surplus goods of a rich person if they are necessary to keep him
from perishing." If we do, however, someone is likely to ask us for an
argument to support this controversial proposition. In Locke, the ar-
gument is based on the seminal fact of God's creating the world for
the sustenance of all men:
God made Man, and planted in him, as in all other Animals, a strong desire
of Self-preservation, and furnished the World with things fit for Food and
Rayment and other Necessaries of Life, Subservient to His design, that
Man should live and abide for some time upon the Face of the Earth, and
not that so curious and wonderful a piece of Workmanship by its own Neg-
ligence, or want of Necessaries, should perish again presently after a few
moments continuance .... 91
Once again, we might, at a pinch, translate that into secular lan-
guage: "That people have a right to make use of the goods that may
help them to survive is common sense." It loses a little in the transla-
tion, though. Keeping hold of the idea that we were meant to sur-
vive, and that being denied access to the naturally available
resources that we need is offensive to the fact of our existence is
difficult in a secular tradition.
One of the dominant issues in property theory - from the seven-
teenth to the twentieth century - has been how to conceive of the
original commons, before a division of resources into individual pri-
vate property took place. Are we to think of the original postulation
of land and natural resources as a negative community - meaning
that no one so far has any rights in the resources - or as a positive
community - meaning that everyone has, by virtue of their human-
ity, some positive claim on the resources that exist? 92 The issue is
important, because if we adopt the latter perspective, an individual's
private acquisition must be constrained by respect for the rights that
the rest of us have in the common, whereas if we adopt the former
view that is not the case. That this remains an issue was brought
home to me some months ago, when I read a review by the Canadian
libertarian philosopher, Jan Narveson, of my own book on prop-
erty. 93 At one point, attacking my critique of Lockean-Nozickian
90. LOCKE, supra note 86, I, 1 42, at 170.
91. Id. 86, at 204-05.
92. For a useful overview, see THOMAS HORNE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POVERTY:
POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN BRITAIN 1605-1834 (1990).
93. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
principles of acquisition, Narveson writes:
Here he [Waldron] assumes prior common status of resources. But what if
there is no such status? What if natural resources are originally nobody's,
but are just there? As Nozick has pointed out, the familiar idea that society
in general owns natural resources requires justification just as much as the
idea that some individual owns some. In Locke's case, a theological story is
supposed to provide this; if we discard the theology - as we plainly should
- then what are we left with? A "rights-vacuum awaiting acts of acquisi-
tion," to use Waldron's phrase,94 seems an entirely plausible answer.98
The point is not to draw the reader's attention to a rather unfavora-
ble review of my book, but to notice how difficult or tendentious it
may be to translate out of the theological language that Locke uses.
If we "discard the theology," as Narveson puts it, does that mean we
are required to adopt the negative view of the original commons? Or
are we entitled to assert some suitably secularized version of Locke's
positive view? Clearly, the exigencies of public debate in a secular
environment do not tell us which translation we should choose.
In a way, of course, it does not matter. Who cares what John
Locke would have said had he been constrained to put his account in
secular terms? He is our sparring partner in all of this, not our
prophet. The question is, which is the most plausible premise with
which to begin our own (secular) discussion of property?
Here, though, the problem points to a general issue in liberal phi-
losophy. Our theories of basic rights, of property and justice, of the
respect due to the human person, are all rooted historically in theo-
ries of natural law and in conceptions that were specifically theistic
and, indeed, Christian in approach. We are now engaged in the busi-
ness of developing ways of thinking about politics and justice that
abandon that orientation. As we do that, we - or, I should say,
many of us - are determined to maintain as rich a sense as possible
of the dignity of the human individual, the equality of worth of all
men and women, and the urgency and priority of justice.
To pretend that we are already in possession of secular concep-
tions that enable us to do that would be foolish. On the contrary,
what is striking about foundational writing in modern secular liberal
thought is its dryness and relative inarticulacy. We talk about
agents, and the requirements of agency; we talk about equal moral
capacities; and we simply assert the priority of justice, while reduc-
ing it in our discussions to a matter of social policy and keeping faith
with local understandings. It all sounds fiat and monochromatic. In a
number of ways the Christian conceptions out of which modern lib-
eralism originated remain richer and deeper than their secular off-
spring. For that reason - and this is my point - they continue to
94. Id. at 155.
95. Jan Narveson, Waldron on Private Property, 29 DIALOGUE 237 (1990) (foot-
note omitted).
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offer themselves as resources and clusters of clues for the modern
political debate.
What and how much we want to translate out of that heritage into
a secular understanding remains open.96 For the time being, the sort
of religious conceptions that underlie works like Locke's Second
Treatise remain available to us as rich sources of intimation for the
development of our theories of man and society, justice and econ-
omy, equality, freedom, and dignity. As the latest episode initiated
by Nozick's work demonstrates, we recur periodically to that source
for inspiration, or to trace the cross-cutting texture of various
strands of argument, or for a new specification of a problem, or just
for a new angle on old material. We may not do so because of its
theological character, but nor do we return to the Lockean material
grudgingly, as it were, despite the God-talk. We go back to writers
in the Christian tradition of natural law and natural rights, because
that is the heritage from which we are in the process of extricating a
body of secular theory, and by no means is it clear that we have
completed that task (or, indeed, that there is only one way to com-
plete it).
I have argued elsewhere that liberals must be prepared to stand up
for the distinctive features of their conception of the human person:
they cannot be neutral about everything. 97 But if our distinctive con-
ception is still in the process of being formed, we must be prepared
to have recourse to its provenance, to the various sources from which
we might obtain the materials for its continued construction, even if
that too taints us with the brush of partisanship or non-neutrality.
In the meantime, the heritage of Christian and natural law
thought on these matters is not itself standing still, waiting to be
redeemed by the secular promise of liberalism. It, too, is in process,
being a lively tradition that is continually worked over by those who
remain faithful to its premises. That - I take it - is what is going
on in the Catholic bishops' Pastoral Letter. Because we have no rea-
son to doubt the intellectual credentials of the authors of that letter,
we should be as interested in what they have made of the natural
law tradition that Locke, for example, appealed to - what they
have made of it from the inside, so to speak - as we are in what
96. A wonderful discussion of this question may be found in CHARLES TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF (1990).
97. See Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 145-
46 (1987). See also Waldron, Legislation and Moral Neutrality, 37 PHIL. Q. 80 (1987).
Both articles are reprinted in JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS
1981-91 (1993).
Locke himself made of it, and in what Rawls and Nozick made of
that. Again, the point is not that we should abandon the enterprise
of developing secular modes of liberal thought in favor of joining the
bishops in their exposition of Christian social doctrine. Our interest
is that we might reasonably expect to find further clues to a rich and
adequate conception of persons, equality, justice, and rights in what
is currently being made of the Christ-centered tradition by those
who remain centered in Christ.
VII
If all this makes sense, then we may want to say that something
like the Pastoral Letter has a natural place in public deliberation,
even when public deliberation is conceived in a secular liberal spirit
and even when many or most participants in that debate do not ac-
cept the premises on which the bishops construct their arguments.
We will miss its potential relevance if we insist that all contributions
to such debate must connect syllogistically with premises that are
already part of a public consensus. If, on the other hand, we see the
value of rethinking the structure of our premises, or of being discon-
certed in our allegiance to them, or of having to confront the rela-
tively dry inarticulacy of our secular conceptions with the richness of
their Christian provenance, or if, in general, we see the value of an
open, challenging, and indeterminate form of public deliberation in
which nothing is taken for granted - if we loosen our conception of
public reason in these or other ways - then we may be less uncom-
fortable about the deployment of religious ideas, even explicitly and
unashamedly theological ideas, in what we may still regard as ulti-
mately a matter for secular politics.
